The problem of the thinking animal, briefly, is that it seems indisputable that human animals, i.e., human beings, or at least, all normal healthy adult human beings, are thinkers. But so, by definition are persons. However, according to the psychological continuity theorist of personal identity, persons are not human beings (they differ in their persistence conditions). So the psychological continuity theory entails the existence of too many thinkers. Moreover, it creates an irresoluble epistemic problem: how do I know I am the person sitting here typing this thinking truly that he is person and not the coincident human animal thinking falsely that he is a person? Finally, if human animals, in addition to persons, are thinkers, they must be persons after all, since their thoughts have whatever complexity and sophistication any ordinary definition of 'person' could require -they have just the same thoughts, after all, as the persons with whom on the psychological continuity account, they 'cohabit', so the neo-Lockean's attempt to identify the persistence conditions for persons collapses into incoherence, since he has to acknowledge different kinds of person with different persistence conditions -as it were person-persons and animal-persons.
My claims are:
(a) that the most sensible thing for the psychological continuity theorist to do in response to the too many thinkers problem is (i) to distinguish the concepts of an object of first-person reference and a thinker of first-person thoughts and
(ii) to say that when an animal coincident with but distinct from a person is a thinker of a first-person thought, not he, but the coincident person, is the object of the thought (b) that this is not a reductio of the psychological continuity theory.
My argument is as follows:
(1) Persons and only persons are objects of first-person reference I take this to be trivially analytic. If anything is a person it is capable of being an object of (its own) first-person reference and anything which is capable of being an object of firstperson reference is a person. (Sometimes, of course, we pretend that something which is not a person is an object of first-person reference. For example, I put a sign on my door saying 'I am unlocked, please come in and wait'. Or the justifiably aggrieved (but rather bossy) Departmental Secretary puts a notice up in the lecturers' coffee room, purporting to be from the 'Cleaning Angel', which reads 'I do not exist. Wash up and dry your cups yourselves.') (2) All persons are psychological continuers This is a formulation of the standard neo-Lockean view, I do not have to defend it here since I am only concerned to bring out its consequences.
(3) Some normal healthy adult human animals are not psychological continuers This is undisputed by neo-Lockeans, since it is an acknowledged fact of observation that all normal healthy adult human beings have had foetal stages to which they are not psychologically connected and some will have late vegetative stages to which they are not psychologically connected. So the substantive point at issue is the neo-Lockean claim (2), which is the claim that (as a matter of conceptual necessity) objects of first-person reference are psychological continuers. Following out the consequences of this (given empirical facts and common-sense truth) leads to the surprising conclusion that there are more thinkers than common-sense acknowledges and that some of these are not objects of their firstperson reference (and so are thinkers that are not persons if we interpret 'person' one way, or are persons that are not objects of first-person reference if we interpret it another way). But it is hardly news that neo-Lockeanism leads to this unless, like Shoemaker's version, it offends common-sense at a different point. Locke himself distinguished between thinking substances, which he thought were probably immaterial, and persons, and so had to acknowledge the existence of thinkers distinct from persons that were not objects of first-person reference -that is, could not think of 'themselves as themselves' in different times and places; he worried about their fate on the Great Day, when all hearts will be opened. Butler and Reid homed in on this duality of thinking substances and person in their critiques of Locke. And, of course, as Olson acknowledges, the fourdimensional version of the psychological continuity account endorses a multiplicity of thinkers that are not objects of first-person reference and requires what Olson calls personal pronoun revisionism. Anyway animalism has its own conflicts with common-sense: in the restricted ontology it endorses, its denial of the transplant intuition, and its acceptance of the consequence that if your brainstem is replaced by an inorganic substance gradually, bit by bit (Olson 1999:141) , without interruption of consciousness throughout, or your cerebrum removed for transplantation, the result is a new rational conscious being, which is not a human being, or else a series of thoughts and sensations that are not the thoughts of anyone (Olson 1999:141-2) . But, it may be said, the thing that is wrong with my response to the problem of too many thinkers is that it creates a mystery. How can a normal healthy adult human being, capable of sophisticated first-person thought, not be capable of referring to himself in the first-person in such thought when the psychologically indistinguishable person is?
How can the human animal lack this capacity which its psychologically indistinguishable twin possesses?
But to ask this question is to misunderstand the proposal. The neo-Lockean claim is that it can be established by conceptual analysis that the following is a de dicto necessary truth:
Only psychological continuers are objects of first-person thought It follows that if A is a human animal, who is in fact not a psychological continuer, the following is a de dicto necessary truth:
If A is not a psychological continuer A's first-person thoughts are not thoughts about A.
It does not follow, even though A is not in fact a psychological continuer, that the following is a necessary truth:
A's first-person thoughts are not thoughts about A.
Nor does it follow that A is necessarily or essentially something whose first-person thoughts are not about itself -no de re necessity follows. This is because it is no part of the neo-Lockean story that A could not have been a psychological continuer. To say that A is not a psychological continuer is to say something about A's history, and A could have had a completely different history. 2 The sense in which it is established by the neoLockean account that A lacks the capacity to think 'I'-thoughts about itself is just that, qua something which is not a psychological continuer, its 'I'-thoughts cannot be about itself, just as qua someone who never marries, it can never be true of Miss Jones that she 2 Or not, if a Kripkean argument for the necessity of origin can be defended. In which case there is no possible world in which A is a psychological continuer and so A could never have referred to himself in the first-person way in thought.But now there is no mystery: this incapacity is explained by the neo-Lockean argument for the de dicto necessity of (2), together with the Kripkean argument for the necessity of origin.
is a bride, or qua someone who never has been and never will be Prime Minister I cannot ever be correctly referred to by the Queen as 'my first Minister'.
Discomfort may remain. According to my version of the neo-Lockean account it
is not possible for something that is not a psychological continuer to be an object of its own first-person thoughts, no matter how sophisticated its thoughts are. 3 But why, it can be asked, should this be so? However, the explanation is simple: to be a psychological continuer is to have a certain kind of history: a certain kind of past, present and future. It is like being a past and future Prime Minister. But whether something is a thinker now and the level of sophistication of its present thoughts cannot depend upon its actual future, certainly not its actual future many years hence. 4 So no matter how sophisticated a creature's present thoughts they cannot ensure that it is a psychological continuer (or a future Prime Minister). Consequently, given the neo-Lockean thesis (2), they cannot ensure that it is an object of its own first-person thoughts.
The proper focus of scepticism about neo-Lockeanism should be on the contention that philosophical analyis can identify any persistence conditions at all forany constraints at all on the past and future histories of -objects of first-person reference as such.
